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Conclusion 16 a point of tension between the two powers. Additionally, as China grows more and more dependent on overseas resources and maritime trade to maintain its current rate of economic development, it is seeking to expand its maritime territorial claims in the East China Sea (ECS) and the South China Sea (SCS). The PRC is developing a maritime strategy for the 21 st Century that will protect their national interests independent of the United States.
With that in mind, the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN's) of force operations will also send a clear signal to PRC leadership and to U.S. partners in the region that the United States intends to stay engaged in the region militarily and as a result reinforces the positive message that forward naval presence brings.
BACKGROUND
The PLAN is building a formidable, defensive force whose primary goal remains territorial claims with its secondary, long-term goal being an offensive force capable of projecting power as far as the Indian Ocean. 6 In order to transform the force to an offensive power, the PLAN will have to focus on developing more capable guided missile destroyers (DDG's), nuclear submarines, and aircraft carriers. States on opposite footing and may bring these two navies to a confrontation in the future.
American resolve to stay engaged as the honest broker in East Asia will become even more critical to the stability of the region and the world. 
ANALYSIS (RED)
It is important to identify the PLAN's operational center of gravity (COG) and exploit the critical vulnerabilities surrounding it (figure 1). The PLAN's strategic objectives are to support PRC interests by defending their controversial maritime territorial claims in the ECS and SCS to include Taiwan.
The PLAN's operational objectives include invasion and then defense of the Spratly Islands, Taiwan, and the Senkaku Islands. The PLAN's critical strengths for invasion and defense of these territories are: proximity to the objectives, their numerical superiority of ground forces, their large ballistic missile inventory, their submarines, their DDG's, their national will, their technical skill, and their growing defense budget. The PLAN's critical weaknesses are: lack of an effective command and control structure, lack of effective combined arms training, poor interfleet coordination, a lack of an aircraft carrier, a lack of allies in the region, and the inability to conduct large scale operations.
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The PLAN's operational COG would be its ability to project ground forces onto these maritime claims and to hold them indefinitely. PRC higher education has strictly focused on engineering and science. 14 PLAN officers are developing their skills required to become good tactical officers and
Communists. They lack a depth of education, however, in military history, political science, and the other liberal arts facets that lead to the skills needed for operational art. This is due, partially, to the PRC's concern in liberalizing education, especially in their PLA officers. This is out of the notion that they might challenge the current Communist establishment.
There is also a push for more technical education in order to be competitive in research and The objective of this operation is to deter PLAN ambitions against Taiwan, the Spratly Islands, and the Senkaku Islands by: demonstrating U.S. resolve to intervene, U.S.
ability to move and mass forces swiftly at the operational level of warfare, and by promoting cooperation among coalition partners. The desired end state would be for the PRC to abandon their operational objectives of regional maritime expansionism and choose a peaceful course of action.
The operational idea would employ MILDEC by feeding the PLAN false intelligence, employing feints and using unusual approaches to the area of operations, overwhelming mass of joint and allied forces, and a clear, unified message of U.S. resolve broadcasted to the PLAN via HF. This would leave them unable to respond quickly at the operational scale, overwhelm PLAN C2, and underscore their inability to conduct effective combined arms tactics. This show of force operation would also demonstrate to regional powers that U.S.
capabilities make the United States a more reliable regional partner over the PRC. for the operation to be effectively swift and maneuverable.
It will take time to get forces into the area of operations. The longer the time for movement, the more likely it is for forces to be detected by PRC intelligence. Thorough planning among forces is required and C2 needs to be in place before operational maneuver can begin to aid in the operational tempo, OPSEC, and safety of coalition forces. The operation would be intended to last four to seven days, but branches and sequels should be written into the plan and agreed upon by participants.
The operation would employ selected principles of war such as mass, maneuver, tempo, deception, and surprise to essentially catch the PLAN leadership off guard as to the operational scale, speed, and level of coordination. OPSEC would be essential for this operation to successfully achieve MILDEC. Not all partners would know all the details.
The commander would employ OPSEC to disguise the fact that this is more than a typical, annual exercise in the eastern portion of the ECS between the JMSDF and the USN. anti-submarine warfare, and mine warfare operations demonstrating the CTF's ability to defeat PLAN forces. The HF broadcasts would address these various capabilities to counter any attempts at anti-access by PLAN ESF forces. SCS forces would conduct similar operations with a similar IO focus during the HF broadcasts. Operational momentum for this operation needs to be maintained for the duration of the operation initially planned from four to seven days.
The show of force operation would be tied together using a common IO plan that directly targets the critical vulnerabilities of poor operational art, poor C2, and lack of effective combined arms training by demonstrating U.S. and coalition capabilities in these areas. The desired effect would be a loss in confidence in the PLAN leadership's ability to project power ashore in maritime territories and then defend them. This would be ascertained in the follow-on assessment phase of the IO plan.
An unpredictable pattern of show of force operations that employ the key elements of MILDEC, OPSEC, operational maneuver, and tempo will challenge PLAN assumptions on their capabilities and current readiness. The goal is to deter the PRC from military options to more peaceful courses of action. Show of force operations can have the added benefit of developing a constructive dialogue among coalition partners.
COUNTERARGUMENTS
There are several counterarguments to a show of force operation like the one participants. The operation may call for closure areas, notices to airmen, and notices to mariners but will strictly follow range clearance procedures. The U.S. Department of State will open all diplomatic channels and be receptive to PRC reactions and demarches. In short, every effort will be made to respect the PRC's internationally recognized claims while conducting freedom of navigation operations. Any decision to escalate this operation will be solely on the shoulders of the PRC leadership. It is likely, however, that the operation will be over (four to seven days in length) before any reaction or escalation could take place.
Additionally, this operational plan would have several branches and sequels to offset any attempt to escalate by the PLAN and the PRC government.
The third counterargument considers more of the global economic damage a confrontation between the U.S. and the PRC in East Asia might have. On the contrary, this operation is designed to counter the PRC's regional maritime ambitions, which should actually have the opposite effect. Show of force operations should improve the regional markets and, in turn, the global economy. U.S. aircraft carrier presence has been proven in the past to improve the health of stock markets and the global economy.
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If the PRC was allowed to achieve their strategic objectives in the East China and Therefore, show of force operations such as the one described could actually be beneficial to the global economy as a demonstration of stability.
As far as the fourth counterargument, the PRC, as well as any nation on Earth, is entitled to organize, train, and equip an armed force in order to defend themselves from would be aggressors. The PRC already has a force capable of defending themselves. Today, however, the PLAN, under the direction of the CCP, is developing offensive combat power that will allow it to project power outside its territorial boundaries. The offensive force will be used to defend its national interests and not just its territorial boundaries.
These national interests, derived from the ruling CCP, will not necessarily be the same as U.S. national interests and may ultimately lead these nations into a confrontation in East Asia as well as other regions of the world. "China aspires to a day when the South China Sea will become, in effect, a Chinese lake and will be accepted as such internationally." 24 Show of force operations will reinforce U.S. national resolve in the region without the PRC having to abandon their right to self defense. The ultimate goal should be one of peaceful cooperation between all the powers in East Asia. U.S. Pacific Command and its components, including U.S. Pacific Fleet and Seventh Fleet, endeavor to achieve that goal.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is a danger of PRC national interests challenging U.S. national interests in East Asia if the PRC military buildup in the region goes unchecked and unchallenged. The PLAN is quickly developing into a formidable force that cannot be ignored. If the PLAN is able to exercise sea denial, sea control, and power projection using amphibious forces in East Asia, the U.S. may lose its ability to maintain forward naval presence in the region and some of its legitimacy with its regional partners and allies. If the region shifts to PRC influence, then PLAN forces may move to project power into the Indian Ocean, Africa, and the into the Pacific to challenge U.S. national interests in those regions as well.
Show of force operations of the scale and tempo as the one described will aid in maintaining U.S. presence and demonstrating U.S. resolve to remain the force to be reckoned with in East Asia. This operation would demonstrate U.S. military capabilities to bring the fight to the PRC's doorstep and challenge their ambitions in the ECS and SCS. These operations would also demonstrate to allies in the region that the United States will remain committed to East Asia to ensure long term stability.
The PRC should be allowed to peacefully rise and become an active partner in world affairs. Nevertheless, they should remain aware that the United States is keeping vigil and retains the tools and alliances to ensure global security. In East Asia, U.S. Pacific Command and its components can reinforce that security through show of force operations.
